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Recent Decisions under the 
Investment Canada Act: 
Is Canada Changing its Stance on 
Foreign Direct Investment? 
Simone Collins 
Abstract:  With the globalization of the world’s economy, countries have relied 
heavily on foreign direct investment within their borders to spur domestic 
economic growth and compete in the global marketplace.  Canada, historically 
a leading destination for foreign investors, has seen its share of global foreign 
direct investment decline steadily over the past several decades.  Most recently, 
Canada has made waves in the global community by taking positive actions to 
interfere with foreign acquisitions of Canadian entities, despite the Canadian 
government’s declarations to global competitors advocating free market 
principles and denouncing protectionist policies.  This article discusses 
Canada’s procedures governing foreign direct investment within its borders and 
examines the Canadian government’s recent foreign direct investment decisions 
and their potential negative implications on Canada’s position in the global 
marketplace.  Given the benefits of foreign direct investment, this article argues 
that Canada needs to improve transparency regarding its decisions on foreign 
direct investment to alleviate global concerns of increasing government 
interference with foreign investors seeking to enter the Canadian economy. 
Additionally, the article argues that Canada should establish clearer metrics for 
its review of foreign direct investment to ensure that Canada maintains 
credibility in the global community as a leading destination for foreign 
investment opportunities.         
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The growth in the world’s economy over the past twenty years has, in 
large part, resulted from the rapid increase in, and globalization of, foreign 
direct investment (FDI)1.  Recognizing the benefits of FDI, many nations 
have taken an active role in liberalizing their trade and investment policies 
to make their investment landscapes more attractive to foreign enterprises.  
Canada followed suit and relaxed its barriers on foreign investment with the 
passage of the Investment Canada Act (ICA) in 1985.  Historically, Canada 
has been a leading destination for FDI.  Recent trends in FDI, however, 
raise concerns that Canada might be losing ground in the global FDI race.  
While Canada still maintains a strong foothold on FDI, downward trends in 
FDI growth and controversy over Canada’s recent applications of the ICA 
indicate Canada should reevaluate its foreign investment law to ensure it is 
in a position to better compete with other nations and continue to take 
advantage of the global FDI market that is set to expand further in the near 
future.  
Although Canada has largely lived up to its self-described status as a 
“wide open foreign direct investment opportunity,”2 the truth of this 
statement has come under scrutiny with Canada’s recent decisions to use 
the ICA to block foreign acquisitions of Canadian companies and to 
undertake enforcement proceedings against a particular foreign investor.  
Most recently, Canada stepped in to prevent the Anglo-Australian mining 
company BHP Billiton Ltd. from acquiring the Canadian Potash 
Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc.3 
While the full impact of Canada’s recent decisions on FDI is still to be 
 
1 Foreign direct investment (FDI) can be defined as the “total value of equity, long-term 
debt and short-term debt held by foreign enterprises” within a country’s borders.  MICHAEL 
HOLDEN, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, OVERVIEW OF CANADIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1 (2008) 
(Can.), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/ prb0833-
e.pdf.  Stated differently, FDI “reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a 
resident entity in one economy (‘direct investor’) in an entity in an economy other than that 
of the investor (‘direct investment enterprise’).”  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 7 (3d ed. 1996), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 10/16/2090148.pdf. 
2 Nirmala Menon, Canada’s Flaherty: We’re Wide Open to Foreign Investment, WALL 
ST. J. BLOG (Nov. 11, 2010, 8:38 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2010/11/11 
/canadas-flaherty-were-wide-open-to-foreign-investment/ (quoting Canadian Minister of 
Finance Jim Flaherty). 
3 See infra Part III. 
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determined, Canada must make necessary changes to its investment review 
process to prevent any potential negative effects on foreign investment in 
Canada and to protect Canada’s ability to invest abroad.  In its review of 
Canada’s foreign investment laws, the Canadian federal government must 
reevaluate its foreign investment review process under the ICA in order to 
better align it with Canada’s stated policy objectives.  Specifically, Canada 
must provide clearer, more objective metrics for its review of FDI to 
prevent political motivations and personal agendas from influencing 
government decisions.  By recognizing the significance of its recent 
decisions and answering concerns with appropriate policy amendments, 
Canada can ensure it continues to reap the benefits of FDI. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the evolution of Canada’s policy on 
FDI and the current review process under the ICA.  Part II provides 
research on the merits of FDI and empirical data on global FDI trends in 
relation to FDI trends in Canada.  Part III discusses the Canadian 
government’s recent history-making applications of the ICA that potentially 
signify a change of course in the government’s attitude toward foreign 
investment.  Lastly, Part IV argues that, in light of the positive influence of 
FDI and Canada’s desire to attract foreign investors, the Canadian 
government should bring more transparency to the review process under the 
ICA to alleviate global concerns about the potential for increased 
government interference with foreign takeovers of Canadian companies. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CANADA’S POLICY ON FDI 
Government policies have significant influence on FDI as they can 
serve to make a country either more or less attractive to foreign investors.4  
Canada’s attitude and policies on FDI have vacillated over the last forty 
years with the country’s changes in political and public opinion, swaying 
from laissez-faire to protectionist and then back again.5  Prior to the 1970s, 
Canada’s hands-off approach to FDI created a favorable environment for 
foreigners to invest in the country free of any serious obstacles.6  This 
liberal climate took a drastic change, however, when a 1972 publication by 
then-Canadian Consumer and Corporate Affairs Minister Herb Gray on the 
level of FDI in Canada, known as the “Gray Report,” confirmed a growing 
public belief that foreign investment had expanded to potentially harmful 
levels.7  According to the report, the ownership landscape for Canadian 
companies was heavily foreign controlled with foreign ownership at 60% of 
 
4 Steven Globerman & Daniel M. Shapiro, The Impact of Government Policies on 
Foreign Direct Investment: The Canadian Experience, 30 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 513, 515 
(1999). 
5 Chris Lalonde, Dubai or Not Dubai?: A Review of Foreign Investment and Acquisition 
Laws in the U.S. and Canada, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1475, 1484 (2008). 
6 Id. 
7 See GOV’T OF CANADA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1972). 
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manufacturing companies, 76% of the energy sector, and 90% in certain 
other industries.8  The Gray Report indicated foreign control had become so 
rampant that any potential benefits from FDI were overshadowed by the 
serious threat posed to Canada’s economic goals.9 
To counteract these fears, the government implemented the Foreign 
Investment Review Act (FIRA) in 1974, which created an agency tasked 
with review of “all direct and indirect acquisitions of control of Canadian 
businesses and the establishment of all new businesses by foreigners.”10  
The FIRA review process required all foreign investors seeking to acquire 
control of Canadian businesses to submit applications promising significant 
undertakings to ensure their requested investment would bring considerable 
benefits to Canada.11  Although FIRA’s stated mission was “not to 
discourage FDI but to ensure significant benefits to Canadians,”12 the added 
obstacles and burdens the FIRA review process placed on FDI and foreign 
investors were questioned in the 1980s when Canada began to feel the 
negative effects of a significant downturn in FDI.13  In the face of a 
recession in the early 1980s and mounting criticism of the FIRA review 
process from the international community, along with “a better 
understanding, in all sectors of Canadian society, of the costs of a policy 
perceived by foreigners as being antagonistic to foreign capital,” the 
government realized “economic nationalism” should no longer drive its 
attitude and policy on FDI.14 
Following the election of a new Conservative Party, the government 
passed the Investment Canada Act (ICA) in 1985, which repealed FIRA and 
implemented a more moderate review process consistent with the political 
climate shift towards increased foreign investments.15  The stated mission 
of the ICA was a departure from that of FIRA: 
 
8 Id. at 20–21. 
9 Id. at 5–8 (summarizing major economic and social costs associated with foreign 
investment in Canada). 
10  Jean Raby, The Investment Provisions of the Canada–United States Free Trade 
Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 394, 396 (1990). 
11 Globerman & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 516.  During the period between 1974 and 
1984, more than 90% of applications reviewed by the Agency were approved, presumably 
on a finding of a “significant benefit” to Canada.  Raby, supra note 10, at n. 6.  While this 
figure indicates the review process was relatively mild, the Agency’s roughly 7% rejection 
rate is high compared to Australia’s 2.7% rejection rate over the same time frame.  In 
addition, the 7% rejection rate does not reflect the possible deterrent effect FIRA had on 
foreign investors who were discouraged from putting investment proposals up for review, 
although some argue against the existence of any deterrent effect.  Globerman & Shapiro, 
supra note 4, at 516. 
12 Globerman & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 516. 
13 Lalonde, supra note 5, at 1485. 
14 Raby, supra note 10, at 396. 
15 Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.) (Can.). 
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Recognizing that increased capital and technology benefits Canada, 
and recognizing the importance of protecting national security, the 
purposes of this Act are to provide for the review of significant 
investments in Canada by non-Canadians in a manner that 
encourages investment, economic growth and employment 
opportunities in Canada and to provide for the review of investments 
in Canada by non-Canadians that could be injurious to national 
security. 16 
Emphasizing that the new Act was an encouragement of FDI, then-
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney declared, “Canada is open for business 
again.”17 
A.  The Investment Canada Act 
Since its passage in 1985, the ICA has been the body of law governing 
the review of foreign investment in Canada.  Although, like FIRA, the ICA 
requires non-Canadians to obtain government approval before undertaking 
any direct or indirect investment in Canada, the ICA procedures outline a 
new, more streamlined scope of review.18  First, under the ICA, not all 
foreign investments will come under review.  Rather, review of a direct or 
indirect investment or creation of a business by a non-Canadian19 will only 
be triggered when certain thresholds are met.  The ICA requires government 
review of an investment to acquire control of a Canadian business in the 
following cases: (1) direct acquisition20 of control of a Canadian business 
with more than C$5 million (approximately US$4.9 million) in assets;21 (2) 
indirect acquisition22 of control of a Canadian business with more than 
C$50 million (approximately US$49 million) in assets;23 and (3) in the case 
of a World Trade Organization (WTO) investor,24 direct acquisition of 
 
16 Id. § 2. 
17 James M. Spence, Current Approaches to Foreign Investment Review in Canada, 31 
MCGILL L.J. 508, 508 (1985–1986). 
18 Raby, supra note 10, at 397. 
19 Investment Canada Act, § 11. 
20 A “direct acquisition” refers to the acquisition of voting shares, voting interest, or all or 
substantially all of the assets of a corporation incorporated in and carrying on business in 
Canada.  Id. at § 28(1)–(d). 
21 Id. §§ 14(1)(a)–(b), 14(3), 28(1)(a)–(d).   
22 “An indirect acquisition is a transaction involving the acquisition of the shares of a 
company incorporated outside of Canada, which owns a subsidiaries in Canada.”  Investment 
Canada Act—Help with Forms, INDUSTRY CANADA (June 18, 2010), 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk00055.html#indirect2. 
23 Investment Canada Act, §§ 14(1)(d), 14(4), 28(1)(d)(ii). 
24 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an organization consisting of 153 member 
countries that seeks to liberalize trade and establish rules of trade between nations.  
Understanding the WTO: What is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 
2011).  A “WTO investor” refers to an individual who is a WTO member, a government of a 
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control of a Canadian business with more than C$312 million 
(approximately US$305 million) in assets.25 
Acquisitions by WTO investors, whether direct or indirect, may come 
under government review at the C$5 million (approximately US$4.9 
million) and C$50 million (approximately $US49 million) thresholds26 if 
the proposed acquisition relates to “Canada’s cultural heritage or national 
identity.”27  The ICA identifies a reviewable “cultural business” transaction 
as one involving the publication, distribution, and sale of books, magazines, 
periodicals, newspapers, film, or music.28 
In order for an investment to be approved under the ICA, the 
government must be “satisfied that the investment is likely to be of net 
benefit to Canada.”29  This open-ended standard is qualified by the 
following list of factors that the government will take into account when 
determining the existence of a “net benefit”: 
the effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic 
activity in Canada; 
the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the 
[business or industry at issue]; 
the effect of the investment on productivity, industrial efficiency, 
technological development, product innovation and product variety 
in Canada; 
the effect of the investment on competition within any industry or 
industries in Canada; 
the compatibility of the investment with national industrial, 
economic, and cultural policies [of Canada or any province therein]; 
 
WTO member, or a WTOinvestor-controlled entity.  Investment Canada Act, § 14.1(6). 
25 Investment Canada Act, § 14.1(1)(a), (2)–(3); Tony Clement, Investment Canada Act, 
145 CANADA GAZETTE, Feb, 12, 2011, at 238.  Section 14.1(2) of the ICA provides that the 
threshold for WTO investors shall be determined by the Minister in January of each year 
based on the nominal GDP at market prices for the current and previous year, and, pursuant 
to section 14.1(3) of the ICA, that threshold is published in the Canada Gazette.  The 
threshold was C$299 million (approximately US$292 million) for 2010 and C$312 million 
(approximately US$305 million) for 2009.  Investment Canada Act—Thresholds, INDUSTRY 
CANADA (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/h_ lk00050.html.  The 
current WTO threshold is based on book value of assets, but amendments to the ICA that are 
not yet in force propose to increase the review threshold to C$600 million (approximately 
US$587 million) in “enterprise value,” increasing to C$1 billion (approximately US$987 
million) over the next four years.  Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28, 448(1) (1st 
Supp.) (Can.). 
26 Investment Canada Act—Thresholds, supra note 25. 
27 Investment Canada Act, § 15(a). 
28 Id. § 14.1(6)(a)–(e). 
29 Id. § 16(1). 




the contribution of the investment to Canada’s ability to compete in 
world markets.30 
In weighing these factors, the government is not bound by any set 
formula and can consider a multitude of factors tailored to the specific 
situation, giving the government broad discretion in its review process.31  A 
literal reading of the factors suggests that the review process involves a 
significant government undertaking requiring time-consuming, complex 
economic studies.  However, in practice, the ICA review process is not 
nearly as meticulous and exacting as it sounds.32 
Those investments that do not get through the review process 
relatively unimpeded will usually end up in negotiations, where the 
government will insist the applicant guarantee certain undertakings in order 
to ensure a “net benefit” is achieved.33  To persuade the government, “the 
applicant may submit undertakings with respect to such matters as levels of 
employment, Canadian participation, research and development, and 
investment so as to boost his request” for government approval.34  
Consistent with the ICA’s stated purpose of encouraging foreign 
investment, the government has historically preferred to use the ICA review 
process as a means of “obtain[ing] concessions from potential foreign 
investors through side agreements” rather than as a means of preventing 
acquisitions.35 
The review process under the ICA has largely lived up to former Prime 
Minister Mulroney’s 1984 declaration that “Canada is open for business.”  
For the first twenty-three years since the enactment of the ICA, Canada did 
not reject any investment application under the ICA, with the exception of 
certain isolated transactions involving sensitive cultural industries.36  The 
refusal to approve an investment proved so rare that the ICA was described 
as a “paper tiger,”37 and its review process analogized to “a ‘Welcome to 
 
30 Id. § 20(a)–(f). 
31 Raby, supra note 10, at 399. 
32 See BUSINESS LAWS OF CANADA § 14:16 (Miller Thomson LLP ed., 2009) (discussing 
how ICA review of foreign investment proposals is based on “a very open-ended and 
subjective standard,” where approval is obtained by negotiation with government officials 
over the amount of undertakings the foreign investor agrees to carry out). 
33 Id. 
34 Raby, supra note 10, at 399. 
35 Lalonde, supra note 5, at 1488. 
36 Howie Wong & Robert Dechert, Canadian Foreign Takeover Review, BUS. L. TODAY, 
Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 22. 
37 Kevin Ackhurst & Paul Beaudry, Canada: The Investment Canada Act: Paper Tiger 
No More, MONDAQ (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.mondaq.com/canada/article.asp?articleid 
=88800. 
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Canada’ wave from the sleepy Canadian border guard.”38  However, such 
descriptions of the ICA are no longer accurate in light of Canada’s recent 
decisions under the ICA to block foreign takeovers of Canadian companies 
for the first time in the legislation’s history.39 
II.  EMPIRICAL DATA ON THE EFFECTS OF FDI 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to “the total value of equity, 
long-term debt and short-term debt held by foreign enterprises.”40  More 
generally, FDI “involves an entity in one economy (the direct investor) 
obtaining a lasting economic interest in another enterprise in a foreign 
economy.”41  The Canadian government enacted the ICA with the goal of 
attracting FDI into Canada.42  The international consensus, supported by 
numerous studies, is that FDI and the resulting existence of multinational 
companies within a country’s borders has a positive influence on the host 
country’s economy.43  The competition among nations to attract and retain 
global enterprises has led to a dramatic surge in global FDI in the past three 
decades, and nations continue to adapt their policies to be more FDI-
friendly.  According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development in its 2006 World Investment Report, “there were 205 FDI-
related policy changes across the world in 2005, and most of these changes 
made conditions more [favorable] for foreign companies to enter and 
operate.”44  Since 1982, global inflows of FDI have soared, increasing from 
just C$59.4 billion (approximately US$58.1 billion) to over C$1.3 trillion 
(approximately US$1.27 trillion) in 2006.45 
 
38 Wong & Dechert, supra note 36. 
39 See infra Parts III and IV. 
40 HOLDEN, supra note 1. 
41 Ram C. Acharya & Someshwar Rao, Foreign Direct Investment Trends: A Canadian 
Perspective 1 (Industry Canada, Working Paper 2008-13, 2008), available at 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/eas-aes.nsf/eng/ra02066.html (citing the definition of FDI 
provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)). 
42 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
43 See, e.g., WALID HEJAZI, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON PUB. POLICY, DISPELLING CANADIAN 
MYTHS ABOUT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 6–10 (2010), available at 
http://www.irpp.org/pubs/IRPPstudy/IRPP_Study_no1.pdf (discussing the “many economic 
benefits associated with inward FDI,” including advanced technology, increased 
productivity, higher-paid jobs, and better management). 
44 Someshwar Rao et al., Role of FDI in the Canadian Economy: A Synthesis of 
Empirical Research 9 (Industry Canada, Working Paper 2009-04, 2009), available at 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/eas-aes.nsf/eng/ra02088.html (citing U.N. CONFERENCE ON 
TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 23 (2006)).  Most recently, in the 
period from October 1, 2010 to January 15, 2011, at least twenty-seven countries or 
economies adopted policies related to foreign investment, and most of these policies focus 
on liberalizing and promoting foreign investment. UNITED NATIONS, INVESTMENT POLICY 
MONITOR 1 (2011), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20112_en.pdf. 
45 Rao et el., supra note 44, at 6. 
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Studies further indicate that the long-term economic benefits of FDI 
outweigh the possible short-term difficulties.46  A 2007 comprehensive 
appraisal of available evidence prepared by the Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) concludes that FDI brings a net 
benefit to host countries: 
Based on empirical studies so far it is fair to conclude that inward 
direct investment generally help [sic] host countries raise total factor 
productivity and, in consequence, their GDP.  The main channels 
through which this takes effect are, first, direct impacts through (1) 
enhanced access to international trade through the link-up with the 
investor’s international networks; (2) corporate restructuring and 
enhanced governance in the targeted enterprises; and (3) the effect 
on host country competition.  Most of these impacts are present in 
empirical evidence of the effects of M&As on individual companies.  
Secondly, important indirect effects (“externalities”) are possible, 
chiefly in the form of (4) technology spillovers; and (5) the diffusion 
of human capital and knowledge.  OECD (2002) [report] not only 
found evidence of each of these channels but also concluded that 
inward direct investment generally leads to a higher economy-wide 
factor productivity and, in consequence, GDP.47 
As in other nations, the benefits of FDI have been felt in Canada.  
Studies of the impact of FDI on the Canadian economy confirm the 
OECD’s conclusions that FDI stimulates economic growth, finding that in 
Canada (1) foreign-controlled firms have higher productivity levels48 and 
pay higher wages49 than domestic firms; (2) foreign-controlled firms spur 
innovation by spending more on research and development than domestic 
firms;50 (3) FDI contributes to domestic job growth;51 and (4) FDI increases 
capital formation in Canada.52 
 
46 See, e.g., W. Hejazi & P. Pauly, Motivations for FDI and Domestic Capital Formation, 
34 J. INT’L. BUS. STUD. 282, 283 (2003); Madanmohan Ghosh & Weimin Wang, Does FDI 
Accelerate Economic Growth? The OECD Experience Based on Panel Data Estimates for 
the Period 1980–2004, GLOBAL ECON. J., Oct. 2009, at 1.  See infra text accompanying notes 
53–55 for a discussion of the perceived difficulties related to foreign ownership of domestic 
firms. 
47 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 
2007: FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD 87 (2007). 
48 Id.; Hejazi & Pauly, supra note 46, at 287. 
49 HEJAZI, supra note 43. 
50 Rao et al., supra note 44, at 6.  FDI brings about innovation, not just from foreign-
owned firms, but also from domestic firms.  Studies show that inward FDI complements, 
rather than replaces, domestic firm research and development, which dispels fears that 
Canada will “free ride” on foreign-owned intelligence and will not strive to build its own 
knowledge base and technical expertise.  Hejazi, supra note 43, at 27. 
51 HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 26. 
52 Hejazi & Pauly, supra note 46, at 283; Acharya & Rao, supra note 41, at 11.  “Capital 
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Despite offering apparent economic benefits, FDI has faced some 
criticism.  One argument against FDI that has particularly raised concerns 
in Canada is that foreign takeovers of Canadian businesses lead to the 
“hollowing out” of firms’ head offices located in Canada.53  There is a fear 
that foreign takeovers will result in the movement of head offices, and their 
accompanying functions (e.g., human resource management, research and 
development, high-skill and high-wage positions, financial management), 
out of Canada, thereby negatively affecting the Canadian economy.54  
Among other things, head offices are found to benefit local economies 
through “knowledge transfer and knowledge spillovers” into the general 
marketplace.55 
Contrary to these concerns, studies find no evidence supporting a 
“hollowing out” phenomenon in Canada,56 and employment at head offices 
has actually steadily increased from the 1990s through 2005.57  This 
increase in head offices has largely been driven by foreign-controlled firms, 
which have accounted for six out of ten new head-office jobs created during 
the period.58  Furthermore, a survey of senior managers of both foreign-
owned and Canadian-owned multinational firms in Canada indicates 
“foreign-owned subsidiaries operating in Canada have become strategic 
leaders in their company’s [sic] global network.”59 
In spite of evidence supporting FDI’s positive influence on the 
Canadian economy and evidence disputing a “hollowing out” phenomenon, 
FDI remains a controversial topic in Canada as fears of too much foreign 
ownership continue to fuel debate.60  Public perception and apprehension 
about increasing foreign ownership, however, are very different from the 
reality of Canada’s domestic marketplace.  A comparison of FDI activity in 
Canada in relation to the rest of the developed world confirms that such 
fears are unfounded and should not drive policy debate on FDI regulation. 
 
formation” refers to the accumulation of capital stock, which is equipment, buildings, and 
goods that are invested into the economy instead of consumed.  Capital stock is a source of 
economic growth.  Therefore, a higher rate of capital formation leads to increased growth in 
economic productivity and aggregate income.  Capital Formation, THE CANADIAN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params 
=A1ARTA0001384 (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
53 HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 9–10. 
54 Rao et al., supra note 44, at 12. 
55 Id. at 13. 
56 HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 8–9. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 GLEN HODGSON, CONFERENCE BD. OF CANADA, IS CORPORATE CANADA BEING 
HOLLOWED OUT? IT ALL DEPENDS WHERE YOU ARE 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.aspx?did=1931. 
60 HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 1 (discussing and dispelling the “misleading caricature” that 
inward FDI is synonymous with excessive foreign control of Canada’s economy). 
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Canada has historically been an international leader in inward FDI 
(i.e., investment by foreign entities within a country’s borders), and, like the 
general global community, experienced an increase in inward FDI from 
20% of GDP in 1980 to 31% in 2006.61  However, global FDI trends 
suggest “Canada has been losing its attractiveness, relative to other 
countries, as a destination for foreign investment.”62  Canada’s share of 
global FDI has dropped from 15.7% in 1970 to 3.2% in 2006.63  In 1980, 
Canada ranked second behind Ireland in FDI as a percentage of GDP, but as 
of 2004, it ranked eleventh among OECD nations.64  Canada’s growth in 
foreign investment through mergers and acquisitions, the main source of 
FDI in Canada as well as globally,65 lagged behind international levels in 
2004 and 2005.66  Furthermore, recent data shows that FDI in Canada 
actually fell in 2008.67  Most importantly, the decline in Canada’s share of 
global FDI is not simply attributable to the recent increase in FDI in 
emerging markets.  Rather, as indicated above, 68 Canada has seen its share 
of FDI by industrialized countries continually decreasing since 1970. 
While the global upward trend in FDI since 1980 is a result of nations 
significantly liberalizing their foreign investment policies, FDI still 
generally faces more barriers than the international trade in goods.69  A 
2006 OECD study of international regulatory regimes on FDI, revised in 
2010, evaluated the restrictiveness of such policies among OECD nations.70  
The study measures restrictiveness based on “(i) foreign equity restrictions, 
(ii) screening and prior approval requirements, (iii) rules for key personnel, 
and (iv) other restrictions on the operation of foreign enterprises.”71  Based 
on these metrics, Canada was found to be one of the most restrictive nations 
 
61 HOLDEN, supra note 1, at 1; Ghosh & Wang, supra note 46, at 3, 17. 
62 HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 3. 
63 HOLDEN, supra note 1, at 1 fig.3 (citing data from the United Nations World 
Investment Report); Hejazi, supra note 43, at 14 fig.3 (citing data from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development). 
64 Ghosh & Wang, supra note 46, at 3, 17. 
65 HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 6. 
66 Achayra & Rao, supra note 41, at 4–5. 
67 HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 12–13 (noting that, while still an important indicator that 
Canada is not being overrun by foreign investors, the drop in 2008 may have been 
attributable to the global financial crisis). 
68 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
69 Achayra & Rao, supra note 41, at 6. 
70 Blanka Kalinova et al., OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index: 2010 Update 6 (OECD 
Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2010/3, 2010), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/19/45563285.pdf.  The OECD has thirty-four member 
countries, including Canada, the United States, and major economies of Europe.  A list of 
OECD member countries can be found at http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351, 
en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
71 Kalinova et al., supra note 70, at 9. 
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in terms of regimes regulating FDI,72 which is not surprising considering 
Canada’s decline in global share of FDI.  Among the formal restrictions that 
contribute to Canada’s high ranking on the FDI restrictiveness index are: 
[R]estrictions on foreign ownership in select sectors; exclusive 
domestic ownership applied to select natural resource sectors; 
obligatory screening and approval procedures through the Investment 
Canada Act; stipulations that foreign investors must demonstrate 
economic benefits, increasing the cost of entry and discouraging the 
inflow of foreign capital; [and] prior approval of FDI over a certain 
threshold.73 
These restrictions act as barriers to economically beneficial foreign 
investment and contribute to Canada’s position as one of the most 
restrictive countries on FDI. 
III.  RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE INVESTMENT CANADA ACT 
(ICA) 
While the Canadian government continues to assure the world that 
Canada is “wide open” to foreign investment, a series of recent applications 
of the ICA raise questions about whether Canada’s current Conservative 
government, led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper,74 is redefining or 
simply reinforcing restrictions on FDI under the ICA review process.  First, 
in May 2008, the government used the ICA to block a foreign takeover of 
MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA), a Canadian aerospace 
company.  This marked the first time the Canadian government blocked a 
takeover since the ICA was enacted in 1985 (excluding certain instances 
related to unique cultural businesses).75  Then, in July 2009, for the first 
time in the twenty-four year history of the ICA, the government sued 
United States Steel Corporation, a foreign investor, to enforce guarantees 
the company had made when it acquired a Canadian business.76  Most 
recently, in November 2010, the government decided not to approve the 
foreign takeover of the Canadian company Potash Corporation of 
Saskatchewan Inc. by the Australian mining company BHP Billiton Ltd., 
 
72 Id. at 17 graph II-1. 
73 Acharya & Rao, supra note 41, at 6–7. 
  74 Prime Minister Stephen Harper took office as leader of the Conservative minority 
government in Canada after winning the 2006 election.  Phil Hahn, Stephen Harper Wins 
Conservative Minority, CTV.CA NEWS (Jan. 23, 2006, 11:06 PM), http://www.ctv.ca/ 
servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060123/elxn_main_story_060123/20060124?s_nam
e=election2006&no_ads=. 
75 Wong & Dechert, supra note 36. 
76 Sue-Anne Fox, Canada v. US Steel: Recent Developments under the Investment 
Canada Act, N. AM. REG’L FORUM NEWS, Oct. 2010, at 12. 
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finding no “net benefit” to Canada in the acquisition.77 
The Canadian government emphasizes that these are special, isolated 
cases and “should not be construed as a warning of greater intervention in 
the marketplace.”78  While that may be true, these cases potentially signify a 
shift back to the protectionist attitude that spurred stricter regulation on FDI 
in Canada in the 1970s, to the detriment of economic growth.79  Even if the 
Canadian government is not taking a tougher stance on FDI, it must be 
concerned with the message it has sent to the international community of 
foreign investors who may now perceive further obstacles, and 
accompanying costs, to potential investment in Canada.  At the very least, 
the criticism from the international community as a result of these cases 
demonstrates the need for Canada to remove much of the subjectivity from 
its review process under the ICA and present clearer guidelines for foreign 
investors seeking to acquire control within its borders. 
A.  Canada’s Rejection of the MDA Takeover 
On May 9, 2008, then-Minister of Industry80 Jim Prentice “woke up 
the toothless tiger from its slumber” and blocked the proposed acquisition 
of MDA’s aerospace business by deciding that the purchase was not likely 
to bring a “net benefit” to Canada under the ICA’s review process.81  The 
decision to block the transaction was the first time the Canadian 
government had done so since enacting the ICA in 1985 with the purpose of 
encouraging foreign investment.  This decision called attention to Canada, 
as it was a rare departure from the Canadian government’s normal 
reluctance to interfere with market transactions.  However, in this case, the 
government stepped in to block this acquisition because, in its view, the 
transaction presented “national security” concerns warranting its rejection.82 
MDA is the leading Canadian information technology and space 
products company, well known for its satellite technology Radarsat-2, 
which, among other capabilities, monitors Canada’s Arctic.83  Alliant 
Techsystems Inc. (ATK), a U.S.-based aerospace and defense company, 
 
77 Ian Austen, Canada Blocks BHP’s Purchase of Potash, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/business/global/04potash.html?_r=1. 
78 Wong & Dechert, supra note 36. 
79 See supra Part I. 
80 The Minister of Industry is tasked with carrying out the review process under the ICA.  
Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28, §4 (1st Supp.) (Can.). 
81 Wong & Dechert, supra note 36. 
82 Bill Mann, Potash Bids Will Test Canada’s Foreign-Takeover Rules, MARKETWATCH 
BLOG (Aug. 23, 2010, 12:45 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/canada/2010/08/23. 
83 Denis Gascon & Jason P.T. McKenzie, Canada Uses Investment Canada Act to Block 
Acquisition of MDA by Alliant Techsystems, OGILVY RENAULT LLP (Aug. 18, 2008), 
http://m.en.ogilvyrenault.com/mobileweb/content/read/id/76A67C55-CB46-4EE8-9C68-
E6E04D1C31E5. 
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proposed a C$1.325 billion (approximately US$1.296 billion) acquisition of 
MDA, specifically seeking to acquire control of the Radarsat technology.84  
MDA strongly supported the transaction, finding the sale was necessary to 
maintain a thriving space and satellite business,85 and argued to the 
Parliament of Canada that government funding on space technology was 
insufficient to support a company of MDA’s size.86  MDA further argued 
that, through the sale, MDA would have access to the U.S. market, 
providing new growth opportunities that were not possible in Canada.87  
MDA did not believe it could grow in the U.S. defense industry absent 
ownership by a U.S. company.88  For these reasons, MDA’s “shareholders 
and management overwhelmingly approved the deal.”89 
Despite this approval, then-Minister of Industry Prentice rejected the 
deal, siding instead with critics of the transaction who argued the 
acquisition “amounted to a handing over of Canadian taxpayer funded 
technology to the United States”90 because the Canadian federal 
government had provided MDA approximately C$445 million 
(approximately US$435 million) in research and development funding to 
develop Radarsat-2.91  Nationalist sentiment and protectionist concerns 
arose over Canada’s “Arctic sovereignty,” with the government asserting 
that the Radarsat technology was vital to defending Canada’s coastline.92  
MDA’s Chief Executive Officer, Daniel Friedman, rejected this argument 
as a basis for blocking its deal with ATK, stating that the Canadian 
government had “all the necessary powers and authority to ensure that in 
[the] future it will continue to exercise full control over Radarsat 2.”93 
The decision to reject ATK’s bid for MDA was of some surprise, 
 
84 David Ljunggren, Canada Blocks Sale of MDA Satellite Unit to U.S., REUTERS (Apr. 
10, 2008, 4:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1038419320080410?pageNumber 
=1. 
85 Gascon & McKenzie, supra note 83. 
86 Ljundggren, supra note 84. 
87 Gascon & McKenzie, supra note 83. 
88 Wong & Dechert, supra note 36. 
89 Gascon & McKenzie, supra note 83. 
90 Id. 
91 Wong & Dechert, supra note 36. 
92 Id.  Central to concerns about giving the Radarsat technology to the U.S. was the fear 
that Canada would be handing over sensitive data regarding disputes over its Arctic territory.  
“Canada remains at odds with the U.S., as well as Russia, Denmark, and Norway, over a 
number of issues related to Arctic sovereignty, including a dispute over 1.2 million square 
kilometres (460,000 sq. miles) of Arctic seabed estimated to hold up to 25% of the world’s 
undiscovered oil and gas reserves.”  Gascon & McKenzie, supra note 83.  The U.S. 
previously rejected Canada’s claims to sovereignty over the Arctic waters, claiming the 
waters are international territories.  Critics of the MDA transaction also feared that the U.S. 
would prevent Alliant from viewing data gathered by its Radarsat satellite, in particular 
images of U.S. ships sailing the Arctic waters.  Ljunggren, supra note 84. 
93 Ljunggren, supra note 84. 
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considering the Canadian government had formerly ignored calls to tighten 
restrictions on foreign investment and continually declared its hands-off 
attitude to market transactions.  Prime Minister Harper previously assured 
that he “did not want to ‘micromanage’ international investment flows and 
pick which transactions to allow.”94  Similarly, then-Minister of Industry 
Prentice previously stated, “[T]he Investment Canada Act should not—and 
will not—become a shield to protect Canadian industry from the full rigors 
of global competition.”95  To address concerns over its apparent change of 
course, the government insisted it was not becoming protectionist, and 
emphasized that its rejection of the MDA transaction was “a very unique 
situation”96 that “should not be construed as a warning of greater 
intervention in the marketplace.”97 
Nevertheless, the MDA decision, as well as concerns over the 
Canadian government’s prior approvals of high-profile foreign acquisitions 
of iconic Canadian businesses, led the government to reevaluate its review 
process under the ICA.98  The ICA was amended in March 2009 to give the 
Minister of Industry power to review proposed acquisitions if there are 
“reasonable grounds to believe that an investment by a non-Canadian could 
be injurious to [Canada’s] national security.”99  While the amendments 
provide procedures for review of “investments that threaten national 
security,” they do not actually define what constitutes such an 
investment.100  Thus, the ultimate effect of these amendments was to give 
the Minister of Industry broader discretion to review and potentially block 
foreign acquisitions. 
B.  Canada v. U.S. Steel 
In July 2009, not long after the blocking of the proposed purchase of 
MDA, then-Minister of Industry Tony Clement filed a suit in the Federal 
Court of Canada requesting a court order compelling United States Steel 
Corporation to fulfill commitments it had made to the Canadian 
government in order to obtain approval for its acquisition of Stelco Inc. 
back in 2007.101  Specifically, Clement was seeking court enforcement of 
 
94 Gascon & McKenzie, supra note 83. 
95 Id. 
96 Ljunggren, supra note 84. 
97 Wong & Dechert, supra note 36. 
98 Gascon & McKenzie, supra note 83. 
99 Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 20 § 25.2(1) (Can.); see also Ackhurst & 
Beaudry, supra note 37. 
100 Ackhurst & Beaudry, supra note 37. 
101 Fox, supra note 76; see also Industry Minister Clement Takes Further Steps to Hold 
U.S. Steel to Its Investment Canada Act Commitments, INDUSTRY CANADA (July 17, 2009), 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ic1.nsf/eng/04836.html; Beth Ballog, Canadian Industry 
Minister Suing U.S. Steel, PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES (July 22, 2009, 3:26PM), 
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U.S. Steel’s promise to “increase steel production in Canada” and “maintain 
employment levels.”102  As a condition for government approval, U.S. Steel 
had agreed to maintain employment and steel production above a negotiated 
minimum level over a term of three years.103  After acquiring Stelco, 
however, U.S. Steel closed most of its Canadian operations and terminated 
1,500 Stelco employees.104 
In response to the suit, U.S. Steel claimed that its compliance with the 
undertakings was not supposed to be measured until the end of an agreed 
upon three-year term and, therefore, it was not in breach of its 
commitments.105  U.S. Steel further claimed that any breach was due to 
circumstances beyond the company’s control, for which investors should 
not be held accountable.106  The company’s main contention, however, was 
that the enforcement proceedings brought against it under the ICA were in 
violation of Canada’s constitutional protection of the right to a fair trial.107 
In June 2010, the Federal Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Canadian government instituting proceedings and penalties against foreign 
investors as a means of enforcing the ICA.108  Most importantly, in May 
2011, the Federal Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
confirming the enforceability of a foreign investor’s undertakings under the 
ICA.109  This decision is significant because it presents another new 
development in the Canadian government’s application of the ICA.  Not 
only must foreign investors consider whether their proposed acquisition 
may be viewed as a “national security” concern (pursuant to the MDA 
takeover decision and the resulting ICA Amendments), but they must also 
take care in formulating any commitments made to the Canadian 
government, as it is now clear that the Minister of Industry will take action 
to ensure investors’ compliance.  Although “national security” review and 
enforcement proceedings under the ICA are exceptions rather than rules, the 
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mere potential for such applications creates cause for concern in light of the 
high costs foreign investors incur in making acquisition proposals.  By 
permitting foreign investors to incur post-acquisition penalties, the 
Canadian government has armed itself with another means of interfering 
with market transactions. 
C. Canada’s Recent Rejection of BHP’s Bid for Potash Corp. 
The latest significant application of the ICA came in Canada’s review 
of BHP Billiton’s $39 billion hostile takeover bid for Saskatchewan-based 
Potash Corp., one of the biggest takeover bids of 2010.110  On November 3, 
2010, Canada’s then-Minister of Industry Clement announced Canada’s 
decision to block BHP’s bid, stating that the company had not demonstrated 
that the deal would be of net benefit for Canada.111  Although, pursuant to 
the provisions of the ICA, BHP had thirty days from the date of the ruling 
to appeal the decision and make further representations to the government, 
BHP decided to abandon the deal despite $350 million in costs incurred on 
its bid.112 
Although Potash’s management did not approve of BHP’s takeover 
offer,113 the Canadian government’s rejection of BHP’s bid came as a 
 
110 Steven M. Davidoff, As BHP Waits, the Next Steps for Potash, N.Y. TIMES 
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(Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE6AD2FA20101115. 
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share bid as “grossly inadequate.”  Leslie Hook et al., Sinochem Looks to Spoil BHP’s 
Potash Bid, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2010, 8:12 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/88de240a-
c5af-11df-ab48-00144feab49a.html#axzz1ZNxSzrpX.  Potash had also taken its own steps to 
defend against the takeover by filing a securities suit in U.S. district court and adopting a 
“poison pill.”  Edward Welsch, Potash Corp. Sues to Block BHP Takeover Offer, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 23, 2010, at B3; Steven M. Davidoff, Canadian Takeover Rules Weigh on Potash, 
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Aug. 17, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2010/08/17/canadian-takeover-rules-weigh-on-potash/.  A “poison pill” is a defensive tactic 
adopted by a target company’s board of directors to “thwart hostile takeover bids by granting 
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bidder.  STEPHEN B. PRESSER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
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surprise to the global market, as many had predicted that Canada would 
allow the bid to go through without interference, just as it has done for all 
but one of the more than 1,500 reviews undertaken by the government since 
adopting the ICA in 1985.114 
Prior to the Canadian federal government’s rejection, the 
Saskatchewan provincial government, through Premier Brad Wall, 
expressed its disapproval of the takeover due to its desire to maintain 
Canadian control over Potash, a company with strategic control over an 
important natural resource.115  To support its position, Saskatchewan 
commissioned an independent evaluation of BHP’s bid by the non-profit 
organization Conference Board of Canada, which found that BHP’s bid 
would cost the province C$2 billion (approximately US$1.96 billion) in 
lower royalty payments over ten years (or 2% of the province’s annual 
revenue).116  However, the Conference Board’s overall impression was that 
BHP’s proposed takeover was favorable for Saskatchewan, particularly 
when compared with a potential competing bid made by China’s Sinochem 
Corporation.117  The following is a summary of the Conference Board’s 
findings on the risks and opportunities of Potash’s acquisition: 
Due to the nature of [Potash Corp.] and the conditions under which it 
operates (unlike some other mining takeovers) the risk associated 
with acquisition is not related to the potential for [Potash Corp.] to be 
“hollowed out” through negative corporate takeover effects (CTEs).  
Our assessment of the impact of an acquisition of [Potash Corp.] on 
shareholders, governance, senior management, capital, employees, 
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& Das, supra note 111. 
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corporate donations, and community support is that the impact would 
be marginal.  In the case of an acquisition, there are some prospects 
of positive impact on employment, both in production and head 
office jobs.118 
The Conference Board’s report found that BHP’s bid had “few 
negative takeover effects” and could be beneficial to the province in the 
long run, and that an acquisition by a state-owned company like China’s 
Sinochem would pose a threat to Saskatchewan’s economy.119 
Despite the Conference Board’s recommendations, Saskatchewan 
continued to oppose the bid on the basis of the potential lost royalty 
payments.120  However, the final decision on whether to approve a takeover 
under the ICA does not rest with a provincial government, but rather with 
the Canadian federal government.121  The international community thought 
that the report would in fact make it easier for the federal government to 
find a “net benefit,” since the Conference Board concluded BHP’s 
acquisition would be in the province’s best interests.122  Steve Globerman, a 
professor commissioned by the Canadian government to prepare a study on 
its foreign investment laws, expressed his belief that the government would 
approve the deal, stating that “Canadian officials understand ‘selective 
protectionism . . . has long-run potential costs that are really antithetical to 
Canada’s interests.’”123 
Contrary to predictions, then-Minister of Industry Clement announced 
that he did not think BHP’s acquisition of Potash would be of net benefit to 
Canada.124  The government rejected BHP’s proposal even though BHP had 
made commitments to “locate its potash executives in Potash’s home 
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province of Saskatchewan . . . structure the deal so the province doesn’t 
take a big revenue hit and set up a committee to make sure it keeps its 
promises—all things that Canadian officials had signaled they wanted.”125  
Clement publicly stated it was not clear that BHP’s proposed transaction 
would benefit Canada, a conclusion based in part on BHP’s lack of 
expertise in potash mining and marketing.126  However, the Canadian 
government has yet to issue an official explanation of its decision,127 which 
it is required to do under the ICA.128 
The government’s conclusion raised a red flag in the international 
community that Canada was taking a protectionist stance, a position it has 
repeatedly lobbied against in diplomatic talks with other nations.129  
Responding to criticisms of the government’s interference with the deal, 
then-Minister of Industry Clement staunchly defended the decision as “a 
perfectly acceptable thing to do,”130 and retorted that “it doesn’t, quite 
frankly, lie in the mouth credibly of other nations to criticize Canada for a 
single decision about a single situation.”131  Nevertheless, in light of these 
criticisms, the Canadian government is again reevaluating the ICA review 
process and has promised to issue clearer guidelines for foreign investors.132  
The government’s proposal to improve its review process suggests it 
recognizes that continued assurances (e.g., declaring that Canada is “wide 
open”133 for foreign investment) are no longer sufficient. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT ICA DECISIONS AND THE NEXT 
STEPS FOR CANADA 
The full impact of the recent decisions under the ICA has yet to be 
determined.  Like the Canadian government insists, the MDA, U.S. Steel, 
and Potash cases may truly represent unique situations—i.e. decisions 
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126 Greg Quinn & Theophilos Argitis, Canada to Give Investors ‘Guidance’ After BHP 
Drops Potash Bid, BUS. WK. (Nov. 15, 2010, 12:15 AM), http://www.businessweek. 
com/news/2010-11-15/canada-to-give-investors-guidance-after-bhp-drops-potash-bid.html. 
127 Foreign Takeover Decisions Beg More Transparency: Changes to Investment Canada 
Act Could Bolster Canada’s Reputation Abroad, UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY (Sept. 15, 2011), 
http://www.ucalgary.ca/news/sept2011/takeover [hereinafter Foreign Takeover Decisions]; 
Drew Hasselback, If You Want Government Approval for Your Takeover, Do Your 
Homework First, FIN. POST (Sept. 23, 2011, 8:17 AM), http://business.financialpost. 
com/2011/09/23/if-you-want-government-approval-do-your-homework-first/#more-92466. 
128 Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 20, § 23.1 (Can.). 
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Decision on Potash to BHP, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.bloomberg. 
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confined to their specific facts creating no serious threat to foreign 
investors’ ability to acquire control in Canada in the future.  However, 
investors and foreign nations cannot ignore the fact that Canada has 
recently taken actions under the ICA that represent a departure from the 
country’s historical practice.134  With these decisions, the current 
Conservative government has made some waves in the international 
community and has taken steps to strengthen the Canadian government’s 
power to interfere with investment transactions.135 
While the three cases signal the Canadian government is not beyond 
interfering with the market when it finds it necessary, the Potash deal in 
particular raises other important issues that could potentially influence a 
foreign investor’s chances of passing the government’s review under the 
ICA.  First, it can be argued that the Canadian federal government’s 
decision to block the Potash deal was, in part, politically motivated.  At the 
time of the Potash deal review, the Conservative Party in power, led by 
Prime Minister Harper, was a minority government, meaning the party was 
elected with fewer seats in the national legislature than the combined seats 
of all other parties.136  Minority governments enjoy less stability than 
majority governments because they must rely on support from the opposing 
parties in order to pass legislation and stay in power.137  When 
Saskatchewan Premier Brad Wall announced his province’s strong 
disapproval of the deal, Prime Minister Harper’s government was 
 
134 Although Canada ranks as one of the most restrictive countries in terms of its regime 
for managing FDI, Canada’s practice under the ICA has historically been to approve 
transactions that come under review.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  The 
apparent hypocrisy in the government’s recent ICA decisions is highlighted by the fact that, 
although Prime Minister Harper actively promotes free market principles in international 
discussions, all three of these decisions—MDA, U.S. Steel, and Potash—have come under 
his administration.  See Terence Corcoran, Harper’s G20 Baggage, FIN. POST (Nov. 5, 
2010), http://opinion.financialpost.com/2010/11/05/terence-corcoran-harpers-g20-baggage 
(discussing Harper’s promise at the June 2010 G20 Toronto Summit to “‘minimize any 
negative impact on trade and investment of our domestic policy actions’”); see also 
Theophilos Argitis & Andrew Mayeda, Harper’s Free-Market Views Tested by Canada’s 
Capital Inflows, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2011, 11:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-09-22/harper-s-free-market-views-tested-by-canada-s-capital-inflows.html 
(discussing Harper’s reassurance to potential investors after the rejection of the BHP–Potash 
deal that Canada remains open to foreign investment). 
135 Corcoran, supra note 134. 
136 When the Majority Doesn’t Rule Survival Isn’t Easy in Often Short-Lived Minority 
Governments, CBCNEWS (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2008/11/ 
14/f-minority-government.html [hereinafter When the Majority Doesn’t Rule].  In the 2011 
Canadian federal election, Prime Minister Harper’s Conservative Party won a majority of the 
seats in Parliament, marking the first time Harper has enjoyed a majority government since 
he was elected in 2006.  Stephen Harper’s Conservatives Win Canadian Election, BBC 
NEWS (May 3, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13259484. 
137  When the Majority Doesn’t Rule, supra note 136.  The governing minority party may 
lose power by a vote of “no-confidence” from the opposing parliamentary powers. 
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vulnerable to lose the province’s support if it went against Wall’s wishes.138  
Harper’s Conservative Party relied heavily on Saskatchewan’s support, with 
thirteen of the fourteen parliamentary seats in Saskatchewan held by the 
Conservative Party at the time of the Potash takeover review.139  If Harper 
did not respect Saskatchewan’s wishes and allowed the takeover of Potash, 
Wall might have campaigned against Harper’s Conservative Party, which 
would have left the Conservative Party vulnerable to losing seats in 
Saskatchewan during the upcoming 2011 parliamentary election.140  In 
addition, Wall garnered support for his position against the Potash takeover 
from the other provincial leaders, all of whom represented the opposition 
parties in the national legislature.141  While political opposition is not an 
unusual basis for a government’s decision, “politics” is not one of the 
factors of consideration provided for in the ICA.  However, this case 
demonstrates that domestic politics can and do play an influential part in the 
review process. 
The political influence issue leads to another question: How much 
power do the provincial governments have in the ICA review process, and 
how much power should they have?  In the Potash deal, the opinion and 
conclusions of one provincial government appeared to hold a considerable 
amount of weight, even though the ICA clearly designates decision-making 
power to the Canadian federal government.  The questions left in the wake 
of the blocked Potash deal add further emphasis on the need for clarification 
and transparency in the ICA review process. 
Although then-Minister of Industry Clement promised in the fall of 
2010 to issue a clarification of how the Canadian government applied the 
ICA to block the Potash deal, as of September 2011 the government has not 
yet done so.142  The Canadian House of Commons’ review of the ICA is 
ongoing,143 and it is uncertain whether there will be any major change in the 
legislation or Canada’s general policy on FDI. 
In the Canadian government’s review, it is important that substantial 
empirical data—and not false public perception—drive the government’s 
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decisions when developing, changing, or evaluating its policies on FDI and 
making changes to the ICA review process.  Available research finds that 
inward FDI brings substantial benefits to a domestic economy, including 
enhanced access to international trade networks, improved corporate 
governance in targeted enterprises, and increased competition, productivity, 
innovation, capital formation, job growth, and, ultimately, increased 
GDP.144  Moreover, research finds that these considerable benefits do not 
come at the expense of “hollowing out” of Canadian head offices.  Rather, 
research provides evidence of the exact opposite—that Canada has enjoyed 
an increase in head offices and accompanying positive economic influences 
as a result of foreign acquisitions.145 
Despite the fact that Canada has seen its share of global FDI decrease 
over the last decade and the evidence demonstrating the positive impact of 
FDI, fears of foreign ownership of Canadian business continue to be a part 
of the debate.  An important fact often ignored by those who criticize a 
liberal stance on foreign investment is that Canada has been a strong player 
in the outward FDI market—while foreign ownership in Canada has 
increased, Canadian companies are continually acquiring businesses abroad.  
Since 1997, Canada has actually experienced a net outflow of FDI, with 
Canadian investments in other nations exceeding foreign investment in 
Canada.146  Therefore, Canada should be careful not to unduly restrict 
foreign investment and suffer retaliation from the global community as a 
consequence.147 
It is important that the Canadian government emerge from its review 
of the country’s foreign investment law with clear guidelines for 
enforcement of commitments made under the ICA, like the proceedings 
brought against U.S. Steel, and also provide a sincere explanation of its 
decision to reject BHP’s bid for Potash.  Transparency, and not simply 
increased government discretion, must be the focus of changes to the ICA.  
Clarifications of the Canadian government’s stance on FDI and its intended 
use of the ICA to intervene in acquisitions moving forward are necessary to 
regain credibility in the eyes of the global community and show that its 
 
144 See supra Part II. 
145 See supra Part II.. 
146  HOLDEN, supra note 1, at 1; HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 12. 
147 In perhaps the first signs of fallout from the Potash decision, Canadian corporation 
High Liner Foods faces international opposition to its attempted takeover of Icelandic 
Group, a global fish giant based in Iceland.  Terence Corcoran, Bjork Meets Captain High 
Liner, FIN. POST (Jan. 10, 2011), http://opinion.financialpost.com/2011/01/10/terence-
corcoran-bjork-meets-captain-high-liner/#more-9166.  Canada’s decision to protect a 
“strategic natural resource” in the Potash deal now lends credibility to the Icelandic 
government taking the same action to protect its strategic natural resource by preventing 
High Liner’s acquisition.  The Potash deal may end up being the basis for backlash against 
Canadian FDI in other nations and may have set a precedent, however minor, that Canada 
surely does not want to be responsible for. 
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anti-protectionist platform in discussions with global leaders is not just 
smoke and mirrors.148  Data plainly indicates Canada has lost some of its 
sheen as a destination for foreign investment and is becoming less attractive 
relative to its global competition.  Considering Canada currently ranks as 
the one of the most restrictive countries on FDI and is continuing to lose 
ground on more liberal nations like the UK and France,149 the Canadian 
government must structure its policies to better compete in the FDI market, 
not further restrict FDI because of false public perception or political biases. 
The Canadian government was primed for its first major post-Potash 
test with an ICA review of the proposed merger between the Toronto and 
London Stock Exchanges.150  However, the Canadian government was 
never forced to decide whether to approve the deal as it was ultimately 
called off because of a lack of support from the companies’ shareholders.151  
Although the proposed merger did not involve a natural resource, it again 
presented a deal related to a “strategic asset in a strategic industry,”152 
which would have shed light on the existence of potential protectionist or 
political influences motivating the Canadian government’s decisions under 
the ICA.  With the demise of the merger, the Canadian government has for 
now avoided the international scrutiny that will likely accompany a post-
Potash ICA decision.  If the merger had not been called off and Canada had 
decided to block the deal, it would have been much more difficult for Prime 
Minister Harper to persuade other nations that Potash was an aberration and 
Canada is a free-market promoter, not a protectionist government.  The 
international community will not know the true impact of the Potash 
decision until Harper’s government clarifies the ICA review process as 
promised, or another deal involving a “strategic asset” comes under ICA 
review.  The global business community’s interest in the Toronto–London 
merger highlights the need to remove uncertainty and add transparency to 
the ICA review process to lend consistency and credibility to Canada as a 
global force in the FDI market. 
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